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NOTE: A HIDDEN THREAT TO NATIONAL  
SECURITY:  
 







 The production of electrical power is a requirement of 
most societies.1 From the discovery of fire to the splitting of an 
atom, societies have built grand empires, cities, and nations 
around the benefits of power. Today, power production 
continues to play an integral role in the development and 
security of most nations. Modern America is no exception. 
Both the United States military and general society rely 
heavily upon a stable supply of electricity to operate safely 
and effectively. Without the power people fundamentally rely 
on, modern society has the potential to slip into utter chaos. 
When New York, the city that never sleeps, ground to a 
powerless halt in 1977, the potential chaos became a 
temporary reality. The 1977 New York Blackout provides a 
stark example of America's reliance on domestic power 
production. During the New York power outage, it took 
officials twenty-five hours, a little more than one day, to 
 
1 For purposes of clarity, the term power and electricity will be used 
interchangeably to refer to electrical power.  
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restore power to the city.2 Within that time, “arsonists had set 
more than 1,000 fires and looters had ransacked 1,600 stores . . 
. .”3 Regardless of the reasons behind the 1977 New York arson 
and looting, one fact remains, the protection of power 
production capabilities is critical to prevent societal 
breakdown and ensure strong national security.  
 Imagine for a moment that instead of an accidental 
outage, the 1977 New York blackout was the product of an 
intentional act of terrorism. The control, damage, and 
disruption caused by such a hypothetical event, correlated 
with the real effects of the actual blackout, highlights why 
both the United States government and military are constantly 
concerned with the protection of domestic power production 
facilities. Additionally, with the United States military’s heavy 
dependence upon civilian power production, the issue of 
power stability and security is critical. 4  Without a secure 
source of power, especially in times of emergency, the United 
States could find itself in a weak and compromised position. 
Because the production of electricity is crucial to American 
prosperity, there is an ever-present concern regarding the 
physical security and cybersecurity of critical power 
 
2 Jennifer Latson, Why the 1977 Blackout Was One of New York’s Dark-
est Hours, TIME (July 13, 2015), https://time.com/3949986/1977-
blackout-new-york-history/. 
3 Id. 
4 Loren Thompson, Critical U.S. Sites Can’t Cope With a Prolonged 
Power Outage, FORBES (May 18, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2018/05/18/critica
l-u-s-military-sites-cant-cope-with-a-prolonged-power-
outage/#6b328e34436e; see also Dept. of Defense, Defense Science 
Board, Resilient Military Systems and the Advance Cyber Threat, DSB 
REPORTS (Nov. 1, 2019, 2:05 PM), 
https://dsb.cto.mil/reports/2010s/ResilientMilitarySystemsC
yberThreat.pdf; Installation Energy, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRE-
TARY OF DEFENSE FOR SUSTAINMENT, (Nov. 1, 2019, 2:08 PM), 
https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/IE/FEP_index.html; Lisa A. Jung, 
DEPT. OF DEFENSE, FY 2019/ FY 2020 ENERGY RESILIENCE AND CON-
SERVATION INVESTMENT PROGRAM GUIDANCE (Sept. 15, 2017); John 
Conger, DEPT. OF DEFENSE, ELECTRIC POWER RESILIENCE MEMORAN-
DUM (DEC. 16, 2013).  
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production facilities.5  For example, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) has specific guidelines dedicated to the 
protection of nuclear power and waste storage facilities. 6 
These protocols exist specifically to protect nuclear power 
facilities from the threat of physical terrorism, sabotage, or 
organized assault.7 However, in recent years, important non-
nuclear sectors of the domestic power production industry 
have been all but forgotten. New threats, mostly in the realm 
of state gun laws, have created seemingly insurmountable 
hurdles for those power facilities that seek adequate levels of 
physical security. 
 Gun laws are a unique and often inflammatory 
political issue. From strict gun bans to open carry statutes, gun 
laws represent a divisive and controversial issue in American 
politics. Due to the political division regarding gun 
regulations and the fact that the United States is a 
conglomerate of semi-autonomous states, gun laws in one 
state often look very different from those in neighboring 
 
5 Supra note 4; see also United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism et 
al., The Protection of Critical Infrastructures Against Terrorist Attacks: 




sed.pdf; Critical Infrastructure Security, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY (last visited Nov. 1, 2019 2:49 PM), 
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/critical-infrastructure-security; De-
partment of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan (NIPP) 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Re-
silience, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Nati
onal-Infrastructure-Protection-Plan-2013-508.pdf (last visited 
July 14, 2020); 6 U.S.C. § 652 (2019); Department of Homeland Securi-
ty et al., Energy Sector-Specific Plan, Energy Section-Specific Plan 
(2015). 
6 Notice of Issuance of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security 
Personnel; Notice of Effective Date of Statute, 74 Fed. Reg. 46,800 
(Sep. 11, 2009); see also 42 U.S.C. 2201a (2019). 
7 Id.; see also Revision of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security 
Personnel, 84 Fed. Reg. 8,546 (Mar. 8, 2019). 
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states.8 State-level gun laws, particularly the more restrictive 
ones, inadvertently pose a distinct threat to the physical 
security capabilities of myriad American power facilities. 
Some restrictions are so severe that even nuclear facilities have 
been unable to obtain handguns for their security forces. 9 
These state-level restrictions are one reason why federal 
firearms preemption was proposed and applied to the nuclear 
power industry. 10  Regardless, privately-operated power 
 
8 Guide to the Interstate Transportation of Firearms, NRA-ILA (Nov. 2, 
2019, 2:57 PM), https://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/; see also Nicho-
las Duva, Gun Laws Vary State by State: CNBC Explains, CNBC (Nov 
2, 2019, 2:59 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/11/20/gun-laws-
vary-state-by-state-cnbc-explains.html; Traveling This Autumn? Know 
The Laws Before You Go, NRA CARRY GUARD (Nov 2, 2019, 2:03 PM), 
https://www.nracarryguard.com/resources/gun-laws-by-state/ 
(Because gun laws are so complex, as evidenced by the NRA gun 
law map and the CNBC report, the NRA even provides a source that 
gun owners can use to determine the legality of their permits and 
firearms when traveling across state lines.). 
9 Issuance of Orders Designating an Interim Class of NRC Licenses 
Facilities that are Eligible to Apply to the Commission for Authoriza-
tion to use the Authority Granted Under the Provision of Section 
161a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended and Associated 
Federal Register Notice, dated June 5, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML 13038A114); San Onofre Nuclear, Unit 2 and 3 and Independent 
Spent Fuel Storage Installation – Safety Evaluation Re: Issuance of 
Order and Conforming Amendments Concerning Preemption Au-
thority, dated January 8, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 
15027A239); Indian Point Nuclear Generating, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3 – 
Issuance of Order and Conforming Amendments Concerning Stand 
Alone Weapons Preemption Authority, dated January 7, 2016 (AD-
AMS Accession No. ML 14259A218); FRN, Issuance of Confirmatory 
Orders, Authorize Use of Preemption Authority Granted Under Pro-
visions of Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amend-
ed, dated Jan. 19, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 16004A118). 
10 Notice of Issuance of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security 
Personnel; Notice of Effective Date of Statute, 74 Fed. Reg. 46,800 
(Sep. 11, 2009); see also  Revision of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by 
Security Personnel, 79 Fed. Reg. 36,100 (Jun. 25, 2014); Energy, 10 
C.F.R. § 73 (2019); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2201a (2019); Karen D. Cyr et al., 
Firearms Guidelines Implementing Section 161A. of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 and Associated Policy Issues - Supplemental Information 
SECY-08-0050, Commission papers (SECY) for 2008 (Nov 2, 2019, 
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facilities are still forgotten when states propose and apply 
sweeping gun bans and restrictions. These laws have left 
many facilities, even nuclear facilities, utterly defenseless 
against organized kinetic attacks. If America wants to ensure 
strong national security and resilience, the government must 
take action to address the security problems posed by state-
level gun laws.  
 In consideration of the foregoing, to ensure continued 
success and prosperity, specifically in reference to America's 
reliance on domestic power production, the government must 
take action to ensure the adequate security of domestic 
production facilities. Whether the government chooses to 
modify existing NRC preemption guidelines or establish a 
critical infrastructure security force controlled by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), one of the two 
solutions must be selected to ensure continued American 
success and security.  
 This note will address the dangers of firearm 
regulations to power facility security, the history behind 
industry-specific solutions, the current concern over power 
facility physical security, and applicable resolutions to the 
issue at hand. Additionally, this article will not only present a 
comprehensive and thoughtful analysis of the issues but also 
provide a source by which others can easily understand and 
locate current NRC firearm preemption authority. The article 
will cover four sections specific to the current national security 
issues posed by state gun laws. Section one will address the 
national security implications of critical infrastructure 
security, section two will explain the ongoing impact of state 
gun laws on power facility security, section three will explore 




0050scy.pdf; Stephen G. Burns et al., Firearms Guidelines Implementing 
Section 161A. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and Associated Policy Is-
sues - Supplemental Information SECY-08-0050, Commission papers 
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lastly, section four will layout the proposed solutions and their 
effective implementation.   
 
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY 
 
 Multiple national and international agencies have 
discussed the issue of national security as it relates to power 
production facilities, also known generally as critical 
infrastructure (CI).11 These papers, reports, and memorandum 
address both the physical- and cyber-security aspects of 
relevant CI.12 For the purposes of the United Nations (UN) and 
DHS documents mentioned in this article, the term CI 
encompasses “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, 
so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction 
of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact 
on security, national economic security, national public health 
or safety, or any combination of those matters.”13 For example, 
the UN report discusses both the importance of physical- and 
cyber-security at assets crucial to societal functionality and 
safety like train stations, airports, and power production 
facilities. 14  Though the focus of this article is the physical 
 
11 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2019); see also United Nations Office of Coun-
ter-Terrorism et al., The Protection of Critical Infrastructures Against 




sed.pdf; Critical Infrastructure Sectors, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/critical-infrastructure-
sectors (last visited Nov. 5, 2019, 9:24 AM); Critical Infrastructure Se-
curity, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/critical-infrastructure-security 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2019 2:49 PM). 
12 Supra note 4, 5. 
13 Supra note 11. 
14 United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism et al., The Protection of 
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protection of power production facilities, or critical 
infrastructure utilities (CIU), the UN and the DHS apply 
similar analyses of threat and societal disruption to all facets 
of CI. 15  Governments from across the globe, including the 
United States, acknowledge and attempt to address the most 
pressing security concerns as they relate to the protection of 
CI. Though cybersecurity is currently considered the 
prominent threat to CI, physical security is still pertinent, 
especially when simple and effective measures can aid in 
overall CI security.16 
 President Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21), Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience, provides a unique and 
candid look at the importance of CI to the United States, its 
government, military, and citizens.17  Not only does PPD-21 
explain the impact of America's many interdependent societal 
and CI systems, but also expresses security concerns about its 
multiple CI assets.18 PPD-21 is one of the primary documents 
which guides the implementation of modern CI security 
analyses’ and guidelines.19 Though focusing heavily on cyber-
security and its relation to physical-security, PPD-21 and the 
DHS PPD-21 Implementation White Paper express the general 
 
tent/uploads/2019/01/Compendium_of_Good_Practices_Co
mpressed.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2019, 2:45 PM).  
15 Supra note 4, 5. 
16 Supra note 4, 5 (As seen in many of the new documents, especially 
those after the fear of 9/11 have subsided, the new concern in re-
gards to infrastructure security is cyber terrorism. Most of the arti-
cle’s titles and concerns revolve not around a large scale physical 
attack but a large scale cyber-attack or cyber and physical attack 
combined.). 
17 Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resil-
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concern of CI security.20 According to the DHS and former 
President Barack Obama, CI security is important because:  
 
The Nation’s critical infrastructure provides the 
essential services that underpin the American 
way of life. The concept of critical infrastructure 
as discrete, physical assets has become 
outdated as everything becomes linked to 
cyberspace. This “cyber-physical convergence” 
has changed the risks to critical infrastructure 
in sectors ranging from aspects energy and 
transportation to agriculture and healthcare. . . . 
Critical infrastructure owners and operators . . . 
continue to experience increasingly 
sophisticated cyber intrusions, which provide 
malicious actors the ability to disrupt the 
delivery of essential services, cause physical 
damage to critical infrastructure assets, and 
potentially produce severe cascading effects.21 
 
As such, the continual protection of America's CI assets, both 
physical and cyber, remains vital due to the potential damage 
and cascading effects that result from CI, particularly CIU, 
disruption. Though the concerns expressed in PPD-21 and the 
DHS PPD-21 White Paper represent a single piece of the 
puzzle when it comes to understanding CI importance, they 
provide an insightful brief of the issues facing CI assets and 
their relation to national security. Likewise, because CIUs are 
part of overall CI, CIUs should receive the same security 
treatments as other CI systems and assets.  
 
20 Id.; see also Interagency Security Committee, Presidential Policy Di-
rective 21 Implementation: An Interagency Security Committee White Pa-
per, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
https://www.cisa.gov/publication/isc-ppd-21-
implementation-white-paper (last visited Nov 27, 2019). 
21 Interagency Security Committee, Presidential Policy Directive 21 Im-
plementation: An Interagency Security Committee White Paper, DEPART-
MENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
https://www.cisa.gov/publication/isc-ppd-21-
implementation-white-paper (last visited Nov 27, 2019). 
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 Mirroring PPD-21 and the DHS PPD-21 White Paper is 
the domestic and international acknowledgment of CIUs and 
their importance to societal functionality. 22  Generally, the 
concern of a CIU focused attack is not the fear of potential 
casualties, but the level of control and societal disruption 
possible through the destruction or dominance of a state’s 
CIUs.23 In a special hydroelectric terrorism report, the DHS 
specifically notes that utility disruption or utility control is 
often the goal of CIU terrorism.24 As the DHS explains, CIU 
terrorism, especially in places that rely heavily on small 
numbers of important production facilities, benefits from the 
ensuing control or disruption of desperately needed power 
and not the damage or death caused by the initial attack.25  
 The 1977 New York riots, government studies and 
memoranda, and general news discussing military power grid 
reliance and insecurity provide a greater understanding of the 
impact of hostile CIU control or disruption.26 The interference 
of town, state, or even national power production has massive 
security impacts aside from simple death or CIU destruction. 
 
22 Supra note 4, 5; see also Department of Homeland Security, World-
wide Attacks Against Dams, COWARN (Nov 5, 2019, 10:42 AM), 
http://www.cowarn.org/uploads/news/Worldwide%20Attacks%2
0against%20Dams%20-%202012.pdf (This product is available on the 
Homeland Security Information Network – Critical Sectors (HSIN-
CS) Dams Sector Portal. The HSIN-CS Dams Sector Portal allows for 
secure information sharing between Federal, State, and local agen-
cies and sector owners and operators. For additional distribution 
information, please contact the Dams SSA at dams@hq.dhs.gov.).  
23 Supra note 22. 
24 Department of Homeland Security, Worldwide Attacks Against 
Dams, COWARN (Nov 5, 2019, 10:42 AM), 
http://www.cowarn.org/uploads/news/Worldwide%20Attacks%2
0against%20Dams%20-%202012.pdf (This product is available on the 
Homeland Security Information Network – Critical Sectors (HSIN-
CS) Dams Sector Portal. The HSIN-CS Dams Sector Portal allows for 
secure information sharing between Federal, State, and local agen-
cies and sector owners and operators. For additional distribution 
information, please contact the Dams SSA at dams@hq.dhs.gov.).  
25 Id. 
26 Supra note 4, 5. 
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From societal disarray to the impinging of military operations, 
the crippling effect of CIU disruption reaches far beyond 
initial tolls. CIU disruption can send waves of destruction 
through any community, town, city, state, or nation. As such, 
the security of CIUs is of the utmost importance. 
Unfortunately, a hidden risk to CIU security exists within the 
confines of supposedly benevolent state firearm laws. 
Regardless of need or security, some state firearms law 
actively prevent CIU security forces from obtaining weapons 
desperately needed to ensure stable and secure energy 
production. Without action on the part of the federal 
government, these restrictions will continue to jeopardize 
national security due to their hindrance of adequate security at 
many of the country’s CIUs.  
 
III. GUN LAWS AND THEIR IMPACT ON CIU PHYSICAL SECURITY 
  
Before the government can draft a comprehensive  
solution to firearm-related CIU security concerns, an 
understanding of current federal and state firearm laws is 
required. In general, firearm possession is considered a right 
under the United States Constitution. 27  Regardless of 
application, I am unaware of any state which has banned gun 
ownership outright. However, simple ownership is not the 
issue. Due to the ambiguity prevalent within legal circles 
regarding the scope of the Second Amendment, especially 
those in historically liberal courts and districts, many 
restrictions on ownership have been proposed and applied. 
These restrictions, particularly those relating to the possession 
of common sporting rifles and handguns, present a unique 
challenge for the security of privately owned and operated 
power facilities. Some of these regulations, regardless of 
benevolent motives, have actively prevented CIUs from 
obtaining weapons required for basic security. 28  The stark 
differences between federal and state firearm laws highlights 
the security issues posed by restrictive gun laws.  
 
27 U.S. CONST. AMEND. II; see also Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570, 635-36 (2008); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). 
28 Supra note 9. 
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 Currently, the federal government employs a basic set 
of gun regulations that apply to all states and gun owners. 
These regulations were established in 1934, 1968, and 1993 and 
are enforced by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives (ATF). 29  The ATF enforces and monitors 
compliance with basic federal firearm laws. 30  These laws 
govern a multitude of firearm regulations, but generally, they 
address the ownership and possession of standard firearms as 
well as machine guns, short-barreled rifles, and short-barreled 
shotguns.31 However, regardless of current political rhetoric, 
federal gun laws allow any citizen, without a felony 
conviction, to own and possess most firearms and 
magazines.32 So long as both the weapon and the magazine 
follow specific import and export regulations, size regulations, 
and do not qualify as a fully automatic firearm, they will often 
be considered legal.33 Under federal law, a law-abiding citizen 
is allowed to possess any small arms so long as it is imported 
correctly, complies with weight and size requirements, and is 
not capable of fully automatic fire.34  
  In addition to the laws regulating standard firearms, it 
is also important to note that under current federal law, the 
ATF can also grant permission for law-abiding citizens or 
corporations to own, transfer, and employ machine guns or 
other prohibited weapons.35 The application for a machine gun 
or what is commonly known as a class three weapon or 
 
29 Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-931) (A revision and expan-
sion of the National Firearms Act of 1934); see also National Firearms 
Act., Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat 1236 (1934) (codified as amended at 
26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872); Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act 
Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 922, 925A).  
30 28 U.S.C. § 599A (2019). 
31 Supra note 29. 
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firearm is long, arduous, and comprehensive.36 However, so 
long as a person, or in this specific instance a CIU, follows 
applicable federal law, they can possess and employ whatever 
small arms, even machine guns, they desire.  
 As evidenced by multiple preemption requests filed by 
nuclear facilities in New York and California and both state’s 
restrictive gun laws, CIU’s are more concerned about 
obtaining common arms than obtaining complex and 
expensive prohibited weapons.37 Even in relation to security at 
nuclear facilities, some of the most restrictive parts of state-
level gun laws are those which impede nuclear facilities, or 
any CIUs, purchase and possession of handguns.38 Because the 
ATF minimally regulates the possession of said armament, 
private corporations should have the ability, at a minimum, to 
obtain common small arms. The only time a private CIU 
should face significant hurdles is when they attempt to obtain 
machine guns; specifically, post 1986 production models. 39 
However, for power facilities in California, New York, or 
politically similar states, this is not the reality. Instead, state-
 
36 Supra note 29; see also Buds Gun Shop, How to Purchase NFA Title II 
(“Class 3”), BUDSGUNSHOP.COM (Nov 2. 2019, 11:39 PM), 
https://www.budsgunshop.com/NFAGuidelines.pdf; Gun Trust 
Depot, What are NFA Firearms?, GUNTRUSTDEPOT.COM (Nov 2, 2019, 
11:41 PM).  
37 Supra note 9; see also N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20 (McKinney 2019); 
N.Y. Penal Law § 265.10 (McKinney 2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.00 
(McKinney 2019); Cal. Penal Code § 31000 (2019); Cal. Penal § 30515 
(2019) (These statutes place heavy restrictions on many common 
firearms. From a simple handgun to a modern sporting rifle, each 
statute strictly restricts a person or corporation's right to purchase 
and employ a multitude of weapons.). 
38 San Onofre Nuclear, Unit 2 and 3 and Independent Spent Fuel 
Storage Installation – Safety Evaluation Re: Issuance of Order and 
Conforming Amendments Concerning Preemption Authority, dated 
January 8, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 15027A239). 
39 Supra note 29; see also Philip Wegmann, It’s Still Legal to Own a Ma-
chine Gun (It’s Also Extremely Difficult and Especially Expensive), WASH-
INGTON EXAMINER (Oct. 2, 2017 3:53 PM), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/its-still-legal-to-own-a-
machine-gun-its-also-extremely-difficult-and-especially-expensive. 
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level gun laws significantly interfere with the procurement of 
even simple handguns or common sporting rifles.40  
 In recent years New York and California have 
established themselves as politically liberal states. One 
consequence of said liberalism is the substantial restriction 
and regulation of gun ownership. From limiting the type of 
firearms one can legally possess to requiring waiting periods 
or premises licenses, both California and New York place 
significant restrictions upon their citizens.41 Said restrictions 
may seem initially de minimus. However, when considering 
the restrictions within the context of laws found in states like 
Tennessee and Alabama, or even the federal firearm laws, the 
issues of restriction and security become painfully evident.  
 Tennessee and Alabama, typically conservative states, 
have historically employed minimal restrictions when crafting 
state gun laws. Aside from a few special instances, both 
Tennessee and Alabama defer to federal regulations when 
structuring their gun laws. Therefore, both Tennessee and 
Alabama have laws which allow civilians to possess and carry 
 
40 N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20 (McKinney 2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.10 
(McKinney 2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.00 (McKinney 2019); Cal. 
Penal Code § 31000 (2019); Cal. Penal § 30515 (2019); see also Issuance 
of Orders Designating an Interim Class of NRC Licenses Facilities 
that are Eligible to Apply to the Commission for Authorization to 
use the Authority Granted under the Provision of Section 161a of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended and Associated Federal 
Register Notice, dated June 5, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 
13038A114); San Onofre Nuclear, Unit 2 and 3 and Independent 
Spent Fuel Storage Installation – Safety Evaluation Re: Issuance of 
Order and Conforming Amendments Concerning Preemption Au-
thority, dated January 8, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 
15027A239); Indian Point Nuclear Generating, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3 – 
Issuance of Order and Conforming Amendments Concerning Stand 
Alone Weapons Preemption Authority, dated January 7, 2016 (AD-
AMS Accession No. ML 14259A218); FRN, Issuance of Confirmatory 
Orders, Authorize Use of Preemption Authority Granted Under Pro-
visions of Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amend-
ed, dated Jan. 19, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 16004A118). 
41 N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20 (McKinney 2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.10 
(McKinney 2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.00 (McKinney 2019); Cal. 
Penal Code § 31000 (2019); Cal. Penal § 30515 (2019). 
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loaded handguns as well as possess common sporting rifles 
like the AR-15 and AK-47; weapons typically restricted in 
states like New York and California. 42  Additionally, under 
applicable ATF restrictions, both Tennessee and Alabama 
permit the possession of machine guns, short-barreled rifles, 
and short-barreled shotguns; weapons mentioned by 
regulations such as the NRC’s 2009 firearm guidelines.43 As 
such, both Tennessee and Alabama allow possession of most 
weapons, including machine guns, by those who follow 
applicable federal and state laws.44  
 Because both Tennessee and Alabama allow the 
possession of commonly owned handguns, sporting rifles, and 
standard capacity magazines, as well as defer to federal law in 
the regulation of machine guns, short-barreled rifles, and 
short-barreled shotguns, average civilians and state-based 
private power companies have the freedom to possess any 
small arms they desire and qualify for. 45  Tennessee and 
Alabama, though not alone in the realm of permissive gun 
rights, are examples of states in which CIUs can easily and 
effectively address their physical security needs. CIUs based in 
Tennessee, Alabama, or similarly regulated states, are merely 
required to follow applicable nonrestrictive gun laws and or 
ATF licensing obligations when seeking possession of legal 
small arms –  both semi- or fully-automatic. As a result, 
facilities located in theses permissive states can easily address 
their physical security needs and mitigate the risk of potential 
terrorism, sabotage, or organized kinetic attack. 
 
42 Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351 (2019); Ala. Code § 13a-11-75 (2019); 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1302 (2019); Ala. Code § 13a-11-63 (2019); 
Ala. Code § 13a-11-62 (2019); see also N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20 
(McKinney 2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.10 (McKinney 2019); N.Y. 
Penal Law § 265.00 (McKinney 2019); Cal. Penal Code § 31000 (2019); 
Cal. Penal § 30515 (2019). 
43 Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1302; Ala. Code § 13a-11-63; Notice of 
Issuance of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security Personnel; 
Notice of Effective Date of Statute, 74 Fed. Reg. 46,800 (Sep. 11, 2009). 
44 Notice of Issuance of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security 
Personnel; Notice of Effective Date of Statute, 74 Fed. Reg. 46,800 
(Sep. 11, 2009). 
45 Id. 
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 Many state firearm laws, like those found in New York, 
California, and similar states, differ significantly from those 
found in states like Tennessee and Alabama. As such, though 
CIUs located in states like Tennessee and Alabama face few 
hurdles in arming their security forces, CIUs in states like New 
York or California may find it nearly impossible or downright 
illegal to do the same. The primary difference between CIUs 
located in Tennessee and Alabama versus CIUs situated in 
places like New York and California are the restrictions placed 
on the private ownership of firearms. Whereas states like 
Tennessee and Alabama provide legal avenues for even a 
private citizen to purchase and possess a machine gun, places 
like California and New York place a blanket prohibition on 
not only machine guns but also specific handguns and 
common semiautomatic sporting rifles.46 Additionally, only a 
few exceptions exist which would allow entities, typically state 
and federal law enforcement, to easily and quickly, possess, 
purchase, transfer, and carry weapons as simple as a 
handgun.47 As such, CIUs located in New York, California, 
and similar states, face significant hurdles in seeking adequate 
armaments to meet physical security needs. 
 Restrictive gun laws, like those found in New York and 
California, would not be an issue if not for the fact that said 
gun laws also include corporations and other business entities 
in their prohibitive language. 48  However, keeping to the 
namesake of so-called assault weapon bans, the goal of New 
York and California gun laws is to prohibit possession of 
firearms in all but the most limited of circumstances.49 Because 
anyone, with a little knowledge, can incorporate or form a 
 
46 Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351 (2019); Ala. Code § 13a-11-75 (2019); 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1302 (2019); Ala. Code § 13a-11-63 (2019); 
Ala. Code § 13a-11-62 (2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20 (McKinney 
2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.10 (McKinney 2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 
265.00 (McKinney 2019); Cal. Penal Code § 31000 (2019); Cal. Penal § 
30515 (2019). 
47 Cal. Penal Code § 30625 (2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20 (McKin-
ney 2019). 
48 Id. 
49 Supra note 41; see also Cal. Penal Code § 30625 (2019). 
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business entity, the laws of New York, California, and similar 
states, to achieve their restrictive goals, must include 
corporations and other business entities in their list of 
restricted owners. Additionally, the laws of many restrictive 
states provide exceptions exclusively for law enforcement and 
no one else.50 As such, private CIUs, even nuclear facilities, are 
left out to dry when seeking to employ armed physical 
security measures. Instead of leaving the details of security to 
the corporations who operate and manage these CIU facilities, 
state gun laws force CIUs to rely upon the help of local law 
enforcement; the only persons capable of possessing 
prohibited weapons.51 The issue of gun law impediment is so 
severe that the NRC established firearm preemption 
guidelines to exempt nuclear power and waste storage 
facilities from potential state gun law conflicts.52 
 Not only do restrictive gun laws create headaches and 
extra cost for privately owned CIUs, but they also promote a 
lack of physical security. It is plausible that many for-profit 
private facilities, instead of investing in effective armed 
security, opt to employ cheaper and less restricted means of 
on-sight security. From unarmed guards to an over-reliance on 
surveillance and local law enforcement, restrictive gun laws 
possibly incentivize the inadequate protection of CIUs due to 
cost, time, and potential legal hurdles. In light of the national 
security implications of CIUs, and the fact the nuclear sector 
already employs methods to legally sidestep state gun laws, 
preemption authority or some other means of physical 
security is greatly needed to ensure the security and stability 
of domestic power production. 
 
IV. NRC FIREARMS PREEMPTION GUIDELINES 
  
In response to state firearm restrictions, the NRC employs 
what is known as preemption authorization when addressing 
physical security needs in locations like New York and 
California. Specifically, the NRC provides a method by which 
 
50 Cal. Penal Code § 30625 (2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20 (McKin-
ney 2019). 
51 Supra note 40. 
52 Supra note 9, 10. 
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private and public nuclear power plants and waste storage 
facilities can obtain an exemption from state firearm laws.53 
What makes NRC preemption authority special is the fact it 
specifically addresses security concerns in relation to state-
level gun laws.54 As such, the history and application of the 
NRC preemption guidelines are essential to understand the 
seriousness of the issues at hand. 
  In 2005 and later in 2009, the federal government and 
the NRC implemented guidelines and laws which authorized 
NRC-licensed facilities to possess and employ standard and 
“enhanced weapons” in their security plans. 55  The Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 and the NRC’s firearms guidelines of 2009, 
which have been updated since March 2019, allow NRC-
licensed facilities to apply for authorization to use “enhanced 
weapons” regardless of state law. 56  These guidelines, 
proposed under the post 9/11 Bush administration, were 
established explicitly in consideration of nuclear facility 
security needs, potential terrorist threats, and the difficulty of 
 
53 Supra note 10. 
54 Notice of Issuance of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security 
Personnel; Notice of Effective Date of Statute, 74 Fed. Reg. 46,800 
(Sep. 11, 2009); see also  Revision of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by 
Security Personnel, 79 Fed. Reg. 36,100 (Jun. 25, 2014); Energy, 10 
C.F.R. § 73 (2019); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2201a (2019); Karen D. Cyr et al., 
Firearms Guidelines Implementing Section 161A. of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 and Associated Policy Issues - Supplemental Information 
SECY-08-0050, Commission papers (SECY) for 2008 (Nov 2, 2019, 
8:56 PM), https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/commission/secys/2008/secy2008-0050/2008-
0050scy.pdf; Stephen G. Burns et al., Firearms Guidelines Implementing 
Section 161A. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and Associated Policy Is-
sues - Supplemental Information SECY-08-0050, Commission papers 
(SECY) for 2008 (Nov 2, 2019, 8:59 PM), 
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/commission/secys/2008/secy2008-0050a/2008-
0050ascy.pdf; Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 
594 (2005) (Codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15801-16524). 
55 Notice of Issuance of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security 
Personnel; Notice of Effective Date of Statute, 74 Fed. Reg. 46,800 
(Sep. 11, 2009); see also 42 U.S.C.A. 2201a (2019). 
56 Id. 
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arming security personnel due to restrictive state-level gun 
laws. 57  42. U.S.C §2201a, the law which authorizes NRC 
preemption authority, acknowledges the security implications 
of restrictive state-level firearm laws.58 As mentioned in the 
foregoing:  
 
any law (including regulations) of a State or a political 
subdivision of a State that prohibits the transfer, 
receipt, possession, transportation, importation, or use 
of a handgun, a rifle, a shotgun, a short-barreled 
shotgun, a short-barreled rifle, a machinegun, a 
semiautomatic assault weapon, ammunition for any 
such gun or weapon, or a large capacity ammunition 
feeding device, in carrying out the duties of the 
Commission, the Commission may authorize the 
security personnel of any licensee or certificate holder 
of the Commission (including an employee of a 
contractor of such a licensee or certificate holder) to 
transfer, receive, possess, transport, import, and use 1 
or more such guns, weapons, ammunition, or devices . 
. . ”59 
 
 Furthermore, in support of the contention that state-
level gun laws pose a risk to the protection of CIUs and 
national security, 84 Fed. Reg. 8,547 highlights that the 
addition of:  
 
42 U.S.C. 2201a. Section 161A … provide[d] 
new authority to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission … to enhance security at 
designated facilities of NRC licensees and 
certificate holders and to enhance security with 
respect to certain radioactive material or other 
property owned or possessed by a NRC 
 
57 Supra note 54. 
58 42 U.S.C. § 2201a (2019) (Though the whole law discusses preemp-
tion and its importance, 42 U.S.C. § 2201a(b)(2) specifically discusses 
the public health and safety concern surrounding the security of nu-
clear power and waste facilities.). 
59 Id.  
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licensee or certificate holder, or the 
transportation of such material or other 
property.60  
 
Additionally, since the establishment of firearms preemption, 
nuclear facilities in New York and California, states with some 
of the most restrictive gun laws in the United States, have 
proactively sought preemption from state firearm laws.61 In an 
alarming instance from California, security forces couldn’t 
obtain the handguns they desperately needed to meet basic 
security goals. 62  The facility initially sought state-level 
exemption from the California attorney general before turning 
to the NRC. 63  Despite the magnitude and importance of 
securing a nuclear power facility and waste storage site, 
political forces came into play and the California attorney 
general denied their request; a request that had been granted 
by other California attorneys general in prior years.64 
 The federal government, specifically concerning the 
security of radioactive material, already recognizes the risk of 
some state-level gun laws. This acknowledgment, combined 
with the myriad preemption applications from states like New 
York and California, further solidifies that state-level gun laws 
pose a significant risk to national security and CIU facilities. 
 It is important to note, however, that the NRC is not 
advocating for what some would call the wild west of gun 
deregulation. If a nuclear facility in a state like New York or 
California desires to apply for preemption authority, the 
facility must follow the application process laid out in the 
NRC’s firearms guidelines.65 Additionally, the nuclear facility, 
 
60 Revision of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security Personnel, 
84 Fed. Reg. 8,546 (Mar. 8, 2019). 
61 Supra note 9. 
62 Supra note 38. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Notice of Issuance of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security 
Personnel; Notice of Effective Date of Statute, 74 Fed. Reg. 46,800 
(Sep. 11, 2009); see also Revision of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by 
Security Personnel, 79 Fed. Reg. 36,100 (Jun. 25, 2014); 42 U.S.C.A. § 
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in applying for preemption and weapons authorization, must 
also comply with applicable ATF regulations relating to 
standard and “enhanced weapons.” 66  The nuclear facility 
applying for preemption and weapons authorization must 
certify to the NRC that the use of weapons, enhanced or not, is 
necessary to secure and protect: 
 
[A] facility owned or operated by an NRC 
licensee or certificate holder and designated by 
the Commission, or (2) radioactive material or 
other property that is owned or possessed by an 
NRC licensee or certificate holder, or that is 
being transported to or from a facility owned or 
operated by such a licensee or certificate holder, 
and which has been determined by the 
commission to be of significance to the common 
defense and security or public health and 
safety.67 
 
Additionally, to obtain such authorization, the NRC-licensed 
facility must develop a new security plan, including a 
contingency plan, to secure the facility and train the security 
personnel on the proper use, storage, and maintenance of the 
new weapons. 68  The NRC will only grant preemption and 
weapons authorization after all relevant plans, state law 
analysis, and background checks are complete, and the NRC 
deems preemption and weapons authorization necessary for 
the security of the facility.  
 Again, the NRC application requirements only apply 
in those states which severely restrict the possession of 
firearms to all entities, civilian and corporate. So long as state 
 
2201a. (2019); Energy, 10 C.F.R. § 73 (2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20 
(McKinney 2019); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.10 (McKinney 2019); N.Y. 
Penal Law § 265.00 (McKinney 2019); Cal. Penal Code § 31000 (2019); 
Cal. Penal § 30515 (2019). 
66 Id. 
67 Notice of Issuance of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security 
Personnel; Notice of Effective Date of Statute, 74 Fed. Reg. 46,800 
(Sep. 11, 2009); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2201a. 
68 Id. 
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law does not significantly limit an NRC-licensed facility's 
ability to possess adequate firearms, and the facility, either 
under state or federal law, has the authorization to possess 
and employ standard or enhanced weapons, preemption 
applications and modification of preexisting security plans are 
not necessary. 
 Though restrictive firearm laws may have benevolent 
intentions, the acknowledgment of state law preemption by 
the federal government, combined with preemption requests 
from states like New York and California, further solidifies the 
national security risk gun laws pose to CIU facilities. Simply 
securing nuclear facilities, facilities which only account for 
10% of domestic power production, is not enough. 69 
Regardless of the concern over radiation exposure and death, 
concerns that are unfounded considering statistical analyses of 
nuclear power incidents, national security implications of 
stable power production mandate additional and 
comprehensive measures to expand preemption and or 
security of CIU facilities. 
 Despite the foregoing, it is arguable that the reason 
NRC preemption exists is due to the radiological material used 
in the production of nuclear energy. Such an assertion is not 
incorrect. Our government must take an interest in securing 
 
69 What is U.S. electricity generation by energy source?,EIA, 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 (last visited 











type=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0 (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (When 
researching domestic energy production, the U.S. Energy Infor-
mation Administration (EIA) provides useful tools and information 
on their website to learn about current and past production. For 
more detailed information regarding power production per energy 
sector, refer to the EIA Electricity Data Browser.). 
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nuclear material. From the creation of a dirty bomb to the 
sabotage and subsequent meltdown of a nuclear facility, the 
government and society as a whole, have an interest in 
keeping nuclear facilities adequately armed and secured. 
However, statistically speaking, nuclear facilities are far safer 
than the media and the public gives them credit for. Based 
upon studies of power plant meltdowns, including the 
Chernobyl incident, the risk of public casualties, though 
concerning, is not significant. 70  Even during the recent 
Fukushima incident, according to the Japanese government, 
only one casualty occurred as a direct result of radiation 
exposure.71  
 Likewise, public concern regarding dirty bombs, 
though understandable, is not well-founded. The NRC 
indicates that a dirty bomb, specifically in terms of 
radiological exposure, is not as alarming as the public might 
believe.72 Steven Brill, an author from The Atlantic, indicated 
that an incident involving a dirty bomb in the heart of 
Washington D.C., aside from the casualties associated with the 
 
70 Michael Shellenberger, It Sounds Crazy, But Fukushima, Chernobyl, 
And Three Mile Island Show Why Nuclear Is Inherently Safe, FORBES 
(Nov. 4, 2019 8:35 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2019/03/11/
it-sounds-crazy-but-fukushima-chernobyl-and-three-mile-island-
show-why-nuclear-is-inherently-safe/#45f654121688; see also Safety 
of Nuclear Power Reactors, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION (Nov. 4, 
2019, 8:47 PM), https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-
library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/safety-of-nuclear-
power-reactors.aspx; Radiation Exposure and Cancer, NUCLEAR REGU-
LATORY COMMISSION (Nov. 4, 2019, 9:03 PM), 
https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/radiation/health-effects/rad-
exposure-cancer.html; Backgrounder on Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant 
Accident, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (Nov. 4, 2019, 9:13 PM), 
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-
sheets/chernobyl-bg.html;  
71 Id.; see also Eli Meixler, Japan Acknowledges the First Radiation Linked 
Death from the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, TIME (Nov. 4, 2019, 9:19 
PM), https://time.com/5388178/japan-first-fukushima-radiation-
death/. 
72 Backgrounder on Dirty Bombs, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 
(Nov. 4, 2019, 9:31 PM), 
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1814/ML18143B254.pdf.  
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actual explosion, would result in only one radiation-related 
death out of every 10,000 people exposed.73 To put that into 
perspective, that would result in only 70.2 deaths out of the 
estimated 702,455 people living and working within 
Washington D.C.74 The NRC acknowledges this fact, claiming 
that one is not likely to die from the radiological exposure of a 
dirty bomb and that the purpose of a dirty bomb is to disturb 
instead of destroy.75 The NRC further classifies  dirty bombs as 
weapons of mass disturbance instead of a weapons of mass 
destruction.76  
 In light of the information related to nuclear facilities 
and nuclear waste, issues of power stability, societal 
disruption, and military power reliance become far more 
concerning. Though nuclear security, especially in relation to 
nuclear fuel, is important, the broader impact of power 
production and potential CIU disruption merits more concern 
than securing only nuclear facilities.  
 The federal government already understands and takes 
steps to mitigate the risk of CIU disruption. Both NRC 
preemption and the establishment of the Hoover Dam Police, 
as well as the multiple government documents discussing CIU 
security, evidence the government’s concern regarding the 
physical security of CIUs.77  Unfortunately, the concentration 
 
73 Steven Brill, Is America Any Safer?, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 4, 2019, 
9:51 PM), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/are-we-
any-safer/492761/.   
74 Id.; see also QuickFacts District of Columbia, UNITED STATES CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/DC? (last visited Nov 
4, 2019) (The numbers indicated above are from a 2018 population 
estimate of Washington, DC). 
75 Supra note 72. 
76 Supra note 72. 
77 43 U.S.C. § 373b (2019); Notice of Issuance of Guidelines on Use of 
Firearms by Security Personnel; Notice of Effective Date of Statute, 
74 Fed. Reg. 46,800 (Sep. 11, 2009); Revision of Guidelines on Use of 
Firearms by Security Personnel, 79 Fed. Reg. 36,100 (Jun. 25, 2014); 
Revision of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security Personnel, 84 
Fed. Reg. 8,546 (Mar. 8, 2019); see also Hoover Dam Police Department - 
Safeguarding a National Icon History and Background, BUREAU OF REC-
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of government efforts is misplaced. Ignoring for a second 
regional differences and the general importance of securing 
nuclear material, both hydroelectric and nuclear power 
production only accounted for a measly 26.4% of national 
production in 2018.78 Whereas, in the same year, fossil fuels, 
such as coal, natural gas, and petroleum accounted for a 
whopping 63.6% of national production.79  
 With power grid security and stability being a 
significant concern in relation to national security, taking steps 
to mitigate state gun laws within the nuclear sector is not 
enough. Though NRC preemption addresses concerns over 
nuclear fuel security, it does nothing to address the broader 
issues of CIU stability. If the government wants to be effective 
in securing its national power grid, it needs to take proactive 
steps, as it did concern the NRC weapons guidelines, to 
mitigate the risks of restrictive state gun laws. Without 
additional security, especially for those facilities which make 
up the majority of national power production, the national 
power grid and its CIU producers may never meet basic levels 
of physical security.  
 
V. THE SOLUTIONS AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 
  
A serious gap exists between state laws and the 
physical security needs of CIUs. As seen in the gun laws of 
traditionally liberal states as well as the preemption requests 
by nuclear facilities in New York and California, state gun 
laws are actively preventing private CIUs from achieving high 
levels of physical security. Though government-owned and 
operated CIUs may not face similar hurdles, the fact remains, 
restrictive state gun laws pose a serious threat to the security 
of privately controlled CIUs. Because the American economy 
is capitalistic by nature, privately owned and operated CIUs 
will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. Likewise, 




visited Nov. 5, 2019). 
78 Supra note 69. 
79 Supra note 69. 
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owned CIUs might resist excessive government encroachment 
or ownership of their facilities. As such, the issue of restrictive 
gun laws and CIU security is unlikely to resolve itself under 
current state or federal legislation. To remedy the problem, the 
federal government must take additional steps to provide 
CIUs with dedicated security or exemption from state firearm 
laws.  
 Without diving too deeply into political territory, gun 
laws are a heated and controversial issue in today's politics. 
Both sides of the aisle believe they have the answers and 
appropriate regulations to address concerns over current 
firearm issues. From sweeping controls to broad deregulation, 
both parties are in a constant tug of war over the appropriate 
level of gun control. However, regardless of political affiliation 
or belief, something must be done to address the national 
security issues related to CIUs and state-level gun laws. As 
such, effective proposals must satisfy basic security standards 
as well as appeal to the political leanings of the nation and its 
legislators. In effect, an adoptable policy is one which solves 
the issues of security, while also appealing to both 
conservative and liberal notions of freedom and control. 
Therefore, only two approaches avail themselves of broad and 
effective adoption.  
 The federal government is faced with two viable 
options when it comes to securing privately owned and 
operated CIUs. Avoiding complex individual exemptions and 
sweeping deregulation, both of which would likely fail to 
garner wide support, options of preemption or dedicated law 
enforcement provide the best method for resolving current 
security issues. To achieve the goal of sound national security, 
the government can either adopt and reform current NRC 
preemption guidelines to meet CIU needs or establish a new 
arm of the DHS to provide security for essential CIU facilities. 
It is important to note, however, regardless of application, 
both proposals must rely on metrics of importance, use, and 
megawatt production to avoid unintended circumstances such 
as private citizens' sidestepping state gun laws or waste 
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Importance, use, and megawatt production are critical 
measurements necessary for the creation of an effective 
response to the issue of CIU security. Because some state-level 
gun laws, like those found in New York and California, are 
designed to prevent law-abiding citizens from obtaining 
particular firearms, issues relating to gun laws and proposed 
solutions to CIU security risks, involve distinctly political 
issues. 80  Given the often juxtaposed beliefs of America's 
predominant political parties, proposed solutions to CIU 
security must satisfy both sides of the aisle. Metrics of 
importance, use, and megawatt production are key to ensure 
that both parties approve and adopt one of the proposed 
solutions.   
 Metrics of importance, use, and megawatt production 
provide a benchmark by which the government can determine 
either preemption or security authorization. The ultimate goal 
is to avoid creating a system in which John Doe can use 
personal residential solar panels to qualify as a CIU and claim 
firearms preemption or government security. Though regional 
difference will undoubtedly complicate the issue, an analysis 
of megawatt production combined with metrics of importance 
and use provides the most effective means for authorizing 
security resources or firearms preemption.  
 The United States generally measures CIU output in 
terms of megawatts or gigawatts. 81  To avoid confusion, in 
terms of power production, one megawatt is equivalent to one 
thousand kilowatts; kilowatt being the base metric for power 
output measurement.82 Likewise, one gigawatt is equivalent to 
one thousand megawatts.83 To put this in perspective, seeing 
as one thousand kilowatts is the equivalent of one million 
watts, a standard forty watt light bulb is equivalent to 0.04 
kilowatts. 84  If a power facility produced one megawatt of 
 
80 Supra note 41. 
81 Electricity Explained Measuring Electricity, EIA, 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/measuring-
electricity.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2019). 
82 Id.  
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
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power, that facility would generate enough energy to power a 
total of twenty-five thousand forty watt light bulbs. This 
distinction is important because, depending on the capabilities 
if a private citizen versus the standard capabilities of an 
operational CIU, it provides a generally clear delineation 
between personal and public power production. The goal of 
new preemption laws or security authorization is to protect 
CIUs while also preventing government waste or subversion 
of state law.  
 In 2018, the United States produced a total of 4,273.96 
gigawatts of energy. 85  This measurement of power is a 
combination of measurable personal, on-site, and public 
power production.86 To avoid issues of inappropriate access to 
firearms preemption or government security, an assessment of 
the data and the creation of megawatt cutoff limits must occur. 
Though the statistics are available, an accurate analysis of the 
data, with considerations for regional needs, is outside the 
scope of this paper. However, agencies like the Department of 
Energy (DOE), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), or the NRC have the abilities and knowledge to 
determine correct megawatt cutoff metrics. As such, the 
government should employ the agencies and knowledge 
available to it to establish accurate and practical cutoff limits. 
Because cutoff limits are an effective and necessary tool to 
ensure program efficiency and success, the government 
should also place control of the implementation and 
modification of said limits with the most capable and 
knowledgeable agency available.  
  In addition to the implementation of megawatt cutoff 
limits, the government must employ additional metrics of use 
and importance to determine which facilities should receive 
preemption or security authorization. Though megawatt 
 
85 Supra note 69; see also In 2018, the United States consumed more ener-
gy than ever before, EIA, 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=39092 (last vis-
ited Nov. 6, 2019). 
86 Form EIA-860 detailed data with previous form data (EIA-860A/860B), 
EIA (Sep. 3, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860/ 
(For information relating to 2018 statistics, open the 2018 ZIP file 
available on the linked page.). 
A Hidden Threat to National Security                                 143  
 
  
production is generally an important metric, some facilities, 
especially those closer to the megawatt cutoff limit, should be 
analyzed to determine the importance of their security. These 
analyses of cost-saving and safety are to ensure statutory or 
program success. 
 In general, most utilities operate through the use of 
multiple power production facilities. 87  Additionally, those 
facilities, when combined, often can produce more power than 
is typically used.88 Due to the multitude of facilities available 
to most utility corporations, an inherent amount of backup is 
built into the system. 89  In Tennessee, for example, the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is in the process of 
decommissioning some of its old coal plants. 90  TVA can 
 
87 Id.; see also Potential Paradise Fossil Plant Retirement Final Environ-





aradise%20Final%20EA_Web.pdf; Approaches to Resiliency at TVA, 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (last visited Nov. 27, 2019, 3:41 PM), 
https://www.tva.gov/file_source/TVA/Site%20Content/Energy/T
ransmission/TVA%20Grid%20Resiliency.pdf; How the Electricity 
Grid Works, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Feb. 17, 2015), 
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/how-electricity-grid-works; 
James Bruggers, TVA Votes to Close 2 Coal Plants, Despite Political 




88 Id.  
89 Id.  
90 Potential Paradise Fossil Plant Retirement Final Environmental Assess-





aradise%20Final%20EA_Web.pdf; see also James Bruggers, TVA Votes 
to Close 2 Coal Plants, Despite Political Pressure from Trump and Ken-
tucky GOP, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Feb. 14, 2019), 
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/14022019/tva-coal-power-
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achieve said decommissioning due to the fact they have 
additional facilities capable of meeting and exceeding the 
power needs of their service area.91 In a worst-case scenario, at 
least in TVA’s instance, they have facilities that can backup or 
fill a gap caused by the disabling of one or two of their CIUs.92  
 For a proposed solution to work, in addition to 
implementing a megawatt cut off limit, the government needs 
to determine the use of power produced and the importance 
of the facilities requesting preemption or security. The goal of 
proposed solutions is to retain state gun laws while also 
providing an exemption or security process for facilities 
critical to national security. A simple way to achieve solution 
success is to mandate that only those CIUs which provide 
power to the public or government, not those which are 
dedicated to personal use or sight-based power production, 
qualify for preemption or security authorization.  
 Additionally, once determining that each facility 
satisfies the megawatt and use requirements, the government 
must analyze the importance of said facility in relation to the 
overall needs of the local power grid or service area. The goal, 
specifically when employing government-provided security, is 
to minimize the overall expense and force required to 
maintain a basic level of security. It is not worth the 
government's time to provide preemption or security 
personnel to a production facility whose sole purpose is to 
power a job site, create personal residential power, or provide 
backup in the event of a noncritical facility failure. Though the 
government should take steps to ensure adequate security of 
grid-wide power production, including backup capacity, the 
government should be mindful to avoid overextension of 
preemption, funds, and security forces. 
 Concerning determinations of importance and use, the 




91 Id.; see also Approaches to Resiliency at TVA, TENNESSEE VALLEY AU-
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the DHS, the DOE, the FERC, and the NRC. Each agency, 
especially the NRC, has experience in all or part of the fields of 
energy production, CIU operation, power grid stability, CI 
security, and to some extent, firearms preemption. By 
involving the appropriate agencies in the determination of 
preemption or security authorization, the government can 
more effectively allocate resources and apply the law.  
 In addition to experience and knowledge, agency 
involvement also removes some of the complications 
associated with drafting a law to meet the needs of nationwide 
CIUs. Instead of focusing on an elaborate list of specifics, the 
government can propose general guidelines that its agencies 
can follow and implement in the most effective and efficient 
manner possible.  
  Regardless of the solution, the proposed applications 
of megawatt cut off limits, importance, and use are necessary 
for the implementation of either firearm preemption or 
government-provided security. Without the analysis of 
production, use, and importance, the guarantee of fiscal and 
operational success is uncertain. However, once those policies 
and guidelines are adopted, the implementation of a 
successful solution, either preemption or government security, 
is rather straight forward.  
 
B. FIREARMS PREEMPTION  
  
Preemption, as applied by the NRC, is the first and most 
obvious solution to the issue of CIU physical security. Like it is 
applied to nuclear facilities, preemption for qualifying CIUs 
would allow said facilities to ignore state law and begin 
arming their security forces with previously prohibited 
firearms. 93  The major benefits associated with adopting a 
preemption approach are ease of implementation, the 
efficiency of achievable security, and the lack of overall cost 
associated with the administration of a preemption program.  
 
93 43 U.S.C. § 373b (2019); Notice of Issuance of Guidelines on Use of 
Firearms by Security Personnel; Notice of Effective Date of Statute, 
74 Fed. Reg. 46,800 (Sep. 11, 2009); Revision of Guidelines on Use of 
Firearms by Security Personnel, 79 Fed. Reg. 36,100 (Jun. 25, 2014); 
Revision of Guidelines on Use of Firearms by Security Personnel, 84 
Fed. Reg. 8,546 (Mar. 8, 2019). 
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 First, because the NRC is already engaged in granting 
firearms preemption in states with restrictive gun laws, the 
framework and application of a general CIU preemption law 
is already established. The NRC, since 2009, has been 
amending and shaping its preemption policies to meet the 
requirements of modern-day America.94 The NRC has created 
an effective and functional preemption program for nuclear 
power and waste storage facilities. Aside from the addition of 
the megawatt, use, and importance guidelines, and the 
addition of other agencies, the basic and effective framework 
for a new preemption law already exists. Congress would 
simply have to copy the NRC preemption guidelines and 
lightly modify them to include the new agencies and 
additional requirements. Once modifications have taken place, 
the entire bill can go before its respective bodies, be amended, 
and voted on as necessary. In short, the solution of preemption 
is initially beneficial because it requires minimal drafting or 
debate to modify and broaden an already effective program. 
 Second, efficiency, which also relates to cost, is an 
undeniable benefit of a federal CIU preemption law. Because 
the NRC preemption guidelines, which the government 
should broaden to apply to all CIUs, rely on the owner of the 
nuclear facility to apply for and employ small arms, both 
semi- and fully-automatic, the application of said law is 
inherently efficient. Instead of micromanaging the security of 
nuclear facilities across the nation, the federal government is 
merely acting as an oversight board. The purpose of the 
government in this instance is not to provide security, but to 
provide guidelines by which each nuclear facility can develop 
and obtain the means for their own security.95 Under current 
NRC guidelines the government will only grant preemption 
when nuclear facilities have met certain government-defined 
security and operational goals.96 Once those goals have been 
achieved, depending on the state in which the nuclear facility 
operates, the facility owners can quickly seek possession of 
small arms for their security forces. Aside from oversight and 
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management of the application process, a preemption 
approach similar to current NRC guidelines would cost the 
government very little.  
 Preemption would also be more efficient and cost-
effective due to the complexities surrounding the employment 
of government forces at private facilities. Firearms 
preemption, which leaves security in the hands of the facility 
itself, avoids many of the headaches associated with the use of 
government forces on private land. Instead of dealing with 
applicable regulations, budgeting concerns, access, and 
company security, as well as conflicts regarding the control of 
security forces, preemption provides almost complete control 
to the private corporation. Rather than creating a complex, 
healthy, and viable private-public relationship for security 
forces, preemption leaves everything, but regulatory aspects, 
in the hands of the private corporation. Further, the 
application of preemption is also cost-effective. Instead of 
burdening taxpayers with the cost of creating a new security 
force, the government leaves the development and 
implementation costs to the corporation.  
 In addition to cost and efficiency, a preemption plan is 
also more secure. Unlike efficiency and cost, security relates 
less to government options and more to the benefits of any 
solution other than the current status quo. One of the main 
points elaborated upon in DHS and UN reports is one of 
intelligence sharing and cross-communication.97 Elaborated in 
those reports is the importance of intelligence communication 
protocols.98 One of the best deterrents to attack is intelligence. 
Intelligence allows anyone to prevent an attack or, when 
prevention is not possible, mount an adequate defense. 
Unfortunately, as with all things government-related, some of 
the available intelligence may be classified or restricted. 99 
Intelligence restrictions are why both the DHS and UN 
recommend the implementation of systems that allow for the 
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transmission of intelligence to CIU operators and security 
personnel.100  
 On its face, intelligence sharing seems simple in 
implementation. However, when a company, due to state law, 
must involve outside security forces, intelligence sharing 
becomes significantly more complex. Instead of dealing 
strictly with the corporations and their authorized personnel, 
an additional step of 3rd party authorization comes into play. 
3rd party authorizations add time and complexity to a process 
that, arguably, should be as simple and secure as possible. By 
allowing firearms preemption in restrictive states, the 
government eliminates an unnecessary level of complexity. In 
allowing the power companies to maintain private security 
forces, the streamlining of authorization and information 
security can occur. Instead of creating long chains of 
authorized personal and secret intelligence communications, 
which could increase the risk of a security breach, the 
government can deal with the corporations themselves. In the 
end, the implementation of firearms preemption provides an 
opportunity for intelligence sharing protocols to be 
established, streamlined, and combined with preemption 
security plan requirements. 
 Despite the benefits, preemption does have one 
significant drawback; it lacks organization and uniformity. 
Organization and uniformity are keys to the success of any 
operation. For example, in a game of chess, if one fails to use 
their pieces to their full potential and does not maintain 
organization, the enemy has a greater chance of exploiting 
their adversary's weaknesses. The same sentiment applies to 
the United States military. From the largest of fleet movements 
to basic logistics, uniformity and organization are crucial to 
the understanding of the battlefield and our military's 
operational success. The same notion applies to the protection 
of CIUs. 
 Preemption or government security is useless if it 
cannot ensure uniform application. If there are disparities in 
the security levels of CIUs, especially disparities within the 
same region, preemption will be effectively useless. Though 
some facilities may have and employ adequate security, those 
 
100 Id.  
A Hidden Threat to National Security                                 149  
 
  
who do not could be a weak link within the CIU chain. If 
uniform guidelines of security are not followed or enforced by 
the federal government, threats my still arise and succeed in 
the disruption of stable power production. Though no security 
plan is foolproof, uniformity is key to avoid giving the enemy 
an objectively easy and obvious target.  
 Though preemption is viable in avoiding the 
restrictions associated with state firearm laws, it may prove 
difficult to ensure any level of security uniformity. Even when 
looking at NRC preemption authorization, the government 
merely employs a basic level of security requirements.101 Aside 
from the minimal security requirements needed to obtain 
firearms preemption, the government has little if any control 
over the use of said security forces and weapons. To ensure 
any level of uniformity under a preemption program, the 
government would have to engage in costly and frequent 
monitoring. Though said monitoring may not be unfeasible or 
even as costly as employing government-controlled security, it 
may prove difficult to ensure CIUs are maintaining security 
standards.  
 Like many people witness in their private lives, 
standard operations and daily inspections differ depending on 
what society considers best practices. Societal best practices 
may not always align with the instruction of governing bodies. 
Regardless of origin, the implementation of federal or 
corporate mandates can differ significantly. As such, though 
the government can mandate minimal security requirements 
and monitor them appropriately, the inherent autonomy 
associated with preemption allows for some level of 
operational deviance. Therefore, though preemption is a 
viable option, it lacks, to some extent, strict government 
uniformity.  
 
C. GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES  
  
Though preemption appears to be a strong and viable 
option for addressing the issues of restrictive state firearm 
laws, government-provided security is also another equally 
viable option. Like preemption, there are many benefits 
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associated with government-provided security. Additionally, 
preemption and government security share the overwhelming 
benefit of secure access to government acquired intelligence. 
However, aside from easy access to the intelligence 
community, the benefits of government security differ sharply 
from those associated with preemption.  
 Being almost the natural opposite to a preemption 
approach, the pros and cons of government security are 
closely juxtaposed to those associated with preemption. 
Whereas preemption faces uniformity issues, government 
security does not. Likewise, though preemption favors fiscal 
conservatism, government security favors big government and 
spending. Regardless, government security is still a viable 
approach to the issue of securing vital CIUs.  
 The overwhelming benefit of government security is 
uniformity and control. Instead of leaving the implementation 
of a security plan to the operators of vital CIUs, the 
government takes control of all authorizations and security 
planning. Because the government is the primary controller of 
all CIU security forces, uniform application of procedure, 
armaments, supplies, and training is possible. Instead of 
relying on each power producer to employ, train, and arm 
required security forces; the government can take direct action 
to ensure security across the board.  
 In many ways, government security is more preferable 
to the approach taken by preemption. Instead of relying on 
oversight boards, fines, and inspectors to ensure uniformity of 
security, the government, mainly the DHS, has complete and 
unilateral control over its application of force. By controlling 
the providers of security, the government bypasses issues 
associated with private security and ensures complete 
uniformity through security force regulation and control. As 
such, though preemption can achieve general uniformity, 
government-controlled security is perhaps the most efficient 
and ideal solution when uniformity is the primary goal.  
 In addition to uniformity, government security also 
offers a better application of intelligence sharing than possible 
under a preemption plan. Under preemption, it is likely 
nongovernmental or non-security personnel will require 
access to shared governmental intelligence. The process of 
setting up authorization methods, structures, and plans could 
prove complex, insecure, and costly. However, in terms of 
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government security, said problems don't exist. Because the 
people securing the facility will be under the strict control of 
the federal government, intelligence authorization and 
employment is significantly easier. Rather than authorize 
private nongovernmental persons or security forces, 
government security, due to DHS security clearance 
preauthorization, can distribute information directly to 
relevant security forces. As such, government security is better 
prepared to meet potential threats and avoid divulging 
sensitive information when unnecessary. Though government 
security increases implementation complexity, it reduces 
intelligence inefficiencies and risks due to the authorization of 
those under direct government control and maintenance; a 
feat that neither preemption nor the current state of affairs can 
achieve.  
 Lastly, government security also offers a political and 
drafting benefit in the sense that modification or preemption 
of state law is unnecessary. Because government security 
forces, unlike private security forces, are considered an arm of 
the federal government, state laws do not apply to them. As 
such, government security forces can completely avoid the 
restrictions and issues of state firearm laws. Not only does this 
require less lawmaking, in terms of crafting an effective 
preemption statute, but it is also more politically palatable. 
Because firearm laws are politically divisive issues, states like 
New York and California might be concerned that the federal 
government is trying to create a backdoor to state gun 
legislation through CIU preemption. The provision of 
government security avoids said arguments.  
 Most states already provide an exception to the use of 
firearms by federal law enforcement or the military. If 
anything, the introduction of government security would 
appear as a nonintrusive, non-modifying, answer to current 
issues. Instead of portraying that the federal government is 
trying to change state gun laws, government security provides 
a solution that honors the legal autonomy and law-making 
powers of state governments. Government security is in many 
ways better, because it is easier to implement in the avoidance 
of state gun laws as well as, in some instances, more politically 
palatable. However, government security does have its 
problems; both political and fiscal. Though government 
security has the potential to provide astounding uniformity 
and ease of state law avoidance, government security gives 
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rise to operational costs and its own type of political 
opposition.  
  An effective solution to the issues at hand must 
appease both sides of the political aisle. While preemption 
may appease the sensibilities of conservative lawmakers, 
government-provided security may not. Broadly speaking, 
conservatives focus on fiscal conservatism and small 
government. As such, though conservatives may favor a cost-
effective small government preemption solution, government-
provided security may not be as lucky. Conservatives may not 
support an agency based solution because said solution would 
involve significant cost to the federal government as well as 
government intrusion into the private power sector. Likewise, 
preemption, a solution likely favored by conservatives, might 
garner liberal opposition due to the perceived usurpation of 
state gun laws and a general lack of permeating government 
control. Regardless, however, both solutions, though 
acceptable in their own respects, have the potential to garner 
political opposition from both sides of the aisle. 
 In addition to political opposition, the cost of 
government security is another downside in terms of its 
implementation. Under preemption, private businesses are 
responsible for funding their security programs. However, 
under government security, the federal government will be 
the one responsible. The government will be responsible for 
not only the creation and funding of the organization but also 
the maintenance and training of all who are involved. Instead 
of funding a small oversight committee or security approval 
board under the DHS, the government is funding the creation 
of an entirely new law enforcement branch.  
 Not only will the creation of a new law enforcement or 
security branch be costly, but so will its maintenance. The FBI, 
a federal law enforcement agency, is an excellent example of 
potential security force creation and operational costs.102 Being 
a national law enforcement and investigation agency, the FBI 
has a substantial yearly budget. 103  It is possible that the 
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creation of a government CIU security force could, without 
getting into the actual needs of said force, be close to the 
equivalent of creating a new FBI. Though uniformity of 
security and intelligence is achievable, it will likely cost an 
inordinate amount to establish. With the option of preemption 
available, especially a preemption proposal similar to the 
NRC’s firearm guidelines, government security may be hard 
for Congress, the American people, and residents of 
nonrestrictive states to accept.104 
 Regardless of the aforementioned pros and cons, both 
preemption and government security offer a viable option 
when it comes to the security needs of vital CIUs. Once crucial 
metrics such as megawatt production, use, and importance are 
in place, either option will provide an effective avenue by 
which the government can ensure the security and stability of 
America's CIUs. The only step that remains is for the 
government to choose and act.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
  
In consideration of the foregoing, especially the 
importance of CIUs and the potential security risks posed by 
state firearm laws, preemption provides the most effective and 
adaptable solution available. Though government security has 
the benefit of unadulterated uniformity and control, it is 
inordinately complex and cost-prohibitive. Government 
security would require the creation of new laws, agency 
guidelines, and security protocols, as well as involve 
significant costs. Preemption avoids many of these hurdles. 
Though preemption is by no means a perfect solution, it is the 
easiest to adopt and implement.  
The legal framework for a new preemption law already 
exists. The NRC firearm preemption guidelines provide 
compelling evidence that a similar law would mandate and 
provide for the uniform security of CIUs. With minor 
modifications to current NRC guidelines, preemption can 
provide an effective and rapid response to pressing security 
needs. Even when considering uniformity, a downfall of the 
preemption approach, said concerns are resolvable. Though 
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room remains for CIU autonomy, the presence of oversight 
boards and the creation of minimum mandatory CIU security 
requirements ensures a basic level of security, oversight, and 
implementation. If the government does discover 
discrepancies, the government, like under the NRC, has the 
ability and power to aid in the rectification of any security 
issues.  
 Additionally, though firearms preemption may face 
some political opposition, when considered in comparison to 
available alternatives, especially those as complex and costly 
as government security, preemption becomes the most 
politically and legislatively viable option. Preemption is by far 
the easiest to implement and best-equipped solution to rapidly 
and effectively address current security discrepancies. By 
using current frameworks and procedures from NRC 
guidelines, Congress can rapidly and with minimal 
modification, propose a comprehensive solution to the issues 
at hand. The simplicity by which the government can 
implement preemption is bound to garner widespread 
support, potentially more support than a costly and complex 
government security proposal. As such, though political 
opposition is inevitable, preemption is likely the most effective 
and appealing option when it comes to securing CIUs. 
Therefore, preemption, despite its shortcomings, is the best 
option to protect CIU facilities from the dangers and security 
risks associated with restrictive state firearm laws.  
